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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ERESTINA MARTIN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14492

SAFEWAY STORES, INCORPORATED,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for personal injury sustained as a result
of a slip and fall on a spot of ice on a sidewalk outside a
Safeway grocery store.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor,
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District.

At

the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed
a verdict of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's decision.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellant!s statement of facts is inaccurate
in several respects.
It is uncontroverted that on January 13, 1975 plaintiff
fell and was injured outside a grocery store owned by Safeway
Stores, Incorporated (hereinafter "Safeway").
It had been snowing intermittently throughout the day,
(R. 27-28; 81; 186).

Safeway employees had cleaned and

salted the sidewalk at 2;00 P.M. and again at 5;00 P.M.
(R. 82; ?5; 168). The Safeway employees kept the sidewalk
as clean as possible so as to avoid water being tracked in
that would later have to be mopped.

(R. 168-169).

Between 5:00 P.M. and the time that plaintiff fell,
Bruce Hudson, a Safeway courtesy clerk carrying groceries
out of the store for customers, walked over the area where
the plaintiff fell some twenty to thirty times.

He did not

observe it to be slippery or icy, although it was wet.
(R. 185) .
The evidence at trial was conflicting as to exactly
where the plaintiff fell, but the evidence taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff indicates that the ice
formed on a spot in the sidewalk where there was slight
"spalling" or flaking of the concrete.

There had been no
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previous problem of ice or water collecting at this particular spot.

(R. 155).

The Safeway manager did testify that he has occasionally seen water or snow dropped onto the sidewalk by cars
which were parked with their hoods protruding slightly over
the edge of the walkway.

(R. 157).

At one time neon lights were installed in connection
with the canopy which extended across the store front and
the Safeway sign.

(R. 153). These lights had been inoper-

able for several years prior to the accident.

(R. 43).

There is no evidence that these lights were needed for
adequate lighting, however.

There were two parking lights

in the immediate area of the accident which were working the
night of the accident.

(R. 151; 185).

After plaintiff fell the area was examined by the plaintiff's husband; Mr. Ruben C. Martinez, a Safeway employee;
and Mrs. Julaine Gomez, a customer.

They found a thin

transparent spot of ice about twelve inches by fourteen
inches.

(R. 61, 172).

Either the next morning or the following morning the
plaintiff's husband returned with a photographer who took
photographs of the spot where the "spalling" was.
and 3).

(Ex. 1

However, the condition was not the same as when
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plaintiff fell because no ice was present.

In fact, the

place where plaintiff fell could not be located with certainty*

(R. 91). Although plaintiff's expert testified
i

that in his opinion the photograph showed salt marks which
indicated a "high water line", he admitted that he had no
way of knowing whether the line was left there as a result
of the ice which caused plaintifffs fall, or on some prior
occasion.

(R. 75).
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW
HOW LONG THE ICE HAD EXISTED.

Contrary to the assertions in plaintiff's brief, absolutely no evidence was presented to the trial court tending
to prove when the transparent ice formed on the walkway.
All of the evidence admitted at the trial indicated that
the day of the accident, January 13, 197 5, was a stormy day.
Mr. Johnson, the manager of the Safeway store testified:
Q.

(by Mr. Miner) And now the — do you
recall what the weather was on the 13th
day of January 1975?

A.

To my recollection it was a stormy day.
(R. 27-28).

Mr. Martinez, Safeway!s Inventory Control Clerk, testified:
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Q.

(by Mr. Miner) Now, what was the weather
when you went to work? Was it clear or
snowy or what was the weather?

A*

It was snowy, slushy.

(R. 81).

Mr. Bruce Hudson, Safewayfs courtesy clerk, said that
when he went to work at 5:00 P.M. the walk was being cleaned.
He testified as follows:
Q.

(by Mr. Miner) Did I understand that when
you went to work that somebody was shoveling snow?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Out in front of the store?

A.

Yes.

(R. 186).

This testimony is uncontroverted.

The evidence at trial

established that the employees of defendant shoveled the walkway twice during the afternoon; once at 2:00 P.M. and again
at 5:00 P.M.

The walk was salted on each occasion.

Thereafter the walkway was wet but not icy.

(R. 89).

One of the Safe-

way employees took special precautions to see that the walk
was properly cleaned because he wished to prevent customers
from tracking snow or slush into the store, since he had
the responsibility of mopping the store after closing, the
evening of the accident.

(R. 169).

Plaintiff's husband testified that the ice was clear
and was the same color as the sidewalk and could not be
seen.

(R. 61). Bruce Hudson testified that he had walked
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past the area of the accident some twenty to thirty times
that evening and had not observed the presence of any ice.
(R. 185). Nor had any customers complained of the ice.

(R.

186) •
Plaintiff presented no evidence to show the temperature,
or when freezing could have occurred.

Further, the walkway

had been twice salted a few hours earlier, and undoubtedly
the presence of salt would have prevented freezing at the
usual freezing temperature.

There was no evidence that

weather conditions were such that the precautions taken by
the defendant's employees were not reasonable under the
circumstances.
No evidence was presented to account for the presence
of ice on the sidewalk.

It may be that water from melting

snow from the hood of a car dropped onto the sidewalk and
froze minutes before the accident.

In fact, plaintiff!s hus-

band testified that plaintiff fell directly in front of his
car, which protruded slightly over the walkway.

(R. 581).

Mr. Johnson, the store manager, testified that he has occasionally seen cars drip water on the sidewalk when the warmth
of the engine caused snow on the hood of the car to melt.
(R. 156-157).

It is significant to note that the icy spot

was only twelve inches by fourteen inches in area.

The entire

surface of the walkway was not icy as would have been the
case had the condition causing the formation of the ice been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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general in nature.

Further, the area of the walkway where

the spalling occurred is much larger than the isolated spot
of ice described by witnesses.
A thorough examination of the record will show that
there is absolutely no credible evidence as to how long the
ice had existed prior to the accident, or to account for the
presence of the ice.
POINT TWO
A LANDOWNER IS NOT LIABLE FOR A FALL ON
ICE OR SNOW UNLESS HE FAILS TO MAKE IT
REASONABLY SAFE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
AFTER THE STORM CEASES.
This Court expressed itself clearly on this issue in
Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah2d 427, 511 P.2d 149 (1973). .
In that case the plaintiff was injured as she walked across
a snowy parking lot.

This court held:

The landlord is not a guarantor for the
safety of his tenants as they proceed along the
common ways. An accumulation of ice or snow
upon those portions of the premises reserved for
the common use of his tenants may make the landlord liable for injuries sustained by his tenant
which are due to such an accumulation, provided
the landlord knows, or should have knox^n of the
condition and failed to act within a reasonable
time thereafter to protect against injuries
caused thereby. The mere accumulation of snow
or ice does not ipso facto make the landlord
liable, he must be given a reasonable time
after the storm has ceased to remove the accumulations or to take such measures as will make
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the common areas reasonably safe from those
conditions which pose an unreasonable risk of
harm to the user. (Emphasis added)•
29 Utah 2d at 4 31, 511 P.2d at 151.
Plaintiff relies upon DeWeese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5
Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956) as authority for the
proposition that the issue of negligence should have gone
to the jury.

The situation in DeWeese, however, differs

from this case in one crucial respect:

in DeWeese there

was evidence that the storm and dangerous condition had
existed for some time and no remedial effort was undertaken,
whereas here, there is n<D evidence as to how long the ice
had been, on the sidewalk, and reasonable efforts, through
cleaning and salting had been previously and timely undertaken.
In DeWeese, plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet terrazzo floor.

The evidence showed that terrazzo was slippery

when wet and it is customary for store owners with terrazzo
entrances to use rubber mats during storms.

The evidence

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff also
indicated that the storm began 2 5 to 30 minutes before the
accident.
Like DeWeese, this case involves a permanent condition
on the walk:

spalling in the concrete.

Indeed, there is

scarcely a walkway in the state of Utah that does not have
some spalling present.

No reasonable mind could conclude
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that the spalling, standing alone constitutes negligence.
There was no evidence that this area became icy during previous storms.

In fact, the only evidence was that water

and ice had not accumulated at this spot previously. (R. 155) .
Unlike DeWeese, in this case there is n_o evidence as
to how long the ice had been present on the sidewalk.

In

DeWeese, the plaintiff testified that it had snowed from
25 to 30 minutes prior to the accident.

in this case,

none of the witnesses testified as to how long the ice
was present.
presence.

Nor was evidence presented to account for its

In fact, the testimony of defendant's witnesses

was uncontroverted in establishing that the walkway had been
twice cleared of slush and snow during the afternoon and
salted on each occasion.

Although it remained wet, a condi-

tion which could not be prevented, defendant's employees did
take such measures as necessary to make the walkway reasonably safe.
POINT THREE
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT SAFEWAY EXERCISED REASONABLE CARE IN SNOW
REMOVAL.
The undisputed evidence indicates that the snow was removed from in front of the Safeway store on two occasions during
the afternoon of January 13, 1975.

Mr. Martinez came to work at
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2:00 P.M. on that day.

The first thing he did upon arriving

was clean the sidewalk.
salted at that time.

(R. 82). The sidewalk was also

(R. 168).

At 5:00 P.M., he again reswept the snow and salted the
sidewalk.

(R. 85, 168).

Bruce Hudson, the courtesy clerk, passed the spot where
the small patch of ice was later found on twenty to thirty
occasions between 5:00 P.M. and the time when the plaintiff
fell.

(R. 185). He did not see the ice on any of those

occasions.
Plaintiff's claim that this is evidence of negligence
in that he should have seen the ice, ignores the fact that
there is absolutely no evidence that the ice was on the
sidewalk for any length of time before the plaintiff fell.
Further, plaintiff's husband testified that the patch of ice
was clear and blended in with the color of the cement.

(R. 61)

all the other witnesses concurred in this observation.

(R. 137

171; 100).
POINT FOUR.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE BROKEN NEON
LIGHTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT.
It is undisputed that near the walkway there were some
broken neon lights.
several years.

These lights had been inoperable for

(R. 43). There is no evidence, however,
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that the absence of these lights contributed in any way to
the accident.
The evidence is undisputed that there were other lights
in the parking lot, (R. 151) and that they were on the night
of the accident.

(R. 185).

There is no evidence that the broken neon lights were
for any purpose other than decorative*
POINT FIVE
PLAINTIFFfS "EXHIBIT 4-P" WAS PROPERLY
REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Plaintiff submitted a weather report, showing weather
conditions at the Salt Lake City Airport in January of 197 5.
The trial court rejected the exhibit, not because
weather reports are per se inadmissible, but because the
weather at the Salt Lake City Airport is immaterial to prove
the weather in Midvale, Utah, some 2 0 miles away.
This court held in DeWeese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5 Utah2d
116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956):
It is recognized that in this mountain valley
storms are sometimes spotty and irregular as to
time and place of starting, duration and amount
of precipitation.
5 Utah2d at 122, 297 P.2d at 902.
The law is clear that in matters of determining materiality the trial court should be accorded a large measure
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of discretion and should only be reversed if this discretion
is abused.

Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382

P.2d 560 (1963); Tucker v. Lower, 2 00 Kan. 1, 434 P.2d 320
(1967); Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589
(1970); Carter v. Moberly, 263 Or. 193, 501 P.2d 1276 (1972).
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide:
Rule 45.

[T]he judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will . . .
(b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading the jury.

The weather report offered as Exhibit "4-P" had very
little, if any probative value; it created a substantial risk
of confusing the issues.

The judge did not abuse his dis-

cretion in excluding it.
If plaintiff's attorney felt that it was necessary to
prove what the weather was on January 13, 197 3, he should
have done so by the most direct means:

by questioning the

persons who were present on the day of the accident.
CONCLUSION
The mountain valleys of the state of Utah contain
hundreds of miles of concrete sidewalks in varying states
of repair.

Each winter these sidewalks are subjected to a
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constantly recurring cycle of snow, melting, freezing, thawing and refreezing.

It is virtually impossible to construct

a sidewalk where ice cannot accumulate.
This court has wisely determined that property owners
cannot be insurers of the safety of those who come on their
property.

They should only be held liable for injuries

caused by ice or snow where it has existed for a long enough
time that the property owners should have known about it and
corrected it.
Here the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to
show that the danger had existed for any substantial time
before the accident.

Had the trial court permitted these

issues to go to the jury, any verdict for plaintiff would
have been required to be based upon speculation and not
upon the evidence.

The trial court exercised its proper

supervisory powers in determining as a matter of law that
reasonable minds could not differ in finding that the defendant's employees met their duty under the circumstances
in making the walkway reasonably safe for those risks
which could have been observed or anticipated.

The trial
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1

court rightly directed a verdict of no cause of action,
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & £HRISTENSEN

Merlin R. Lybbert

^ r 4L\\

' (]

Scott Daniels
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
7th Floor, Continental Bank BldgSalt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9 000
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss .

Kathryn S. Vass, being duly sworn, says that
she is employed in the offices of Worsley, Snow and
Christense, Attorneys for Respondent herein, that
she served the Brief of Respondent upon Appellant by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to Mark S. Miner, 219 Felt Building,
341 Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and
depositing same, sealed, with first class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the 3rd day of June, 1976.

- v "(

c/K--

Kathryn ~S . Vass
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day
of June, 1976.
/

&. ..v.. - ., ^ Notary Public, R e s i d i n g
At S a l t Lake City, Utah
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